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INTRODUCTION
In November of 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) jointly issued a widely
demanded and unprecedented resource guide to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA).1 “The Guidance” came in response to a letter
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of over thirty
business organizations, representing the views of over three million
businesses, that identified areas in critical need of clarification
regarding the Agencies’ enforcement of the FCPA.2 Among several
other requests, the Chamber of Commerce letter asked for particu-
lar guidance in mergers and acquisitions. The letter claimed, “[t]he
threat of successor liability even if a thorough investigation is
undertaken prior to a transaction has had a significant chilling
effect on mergers and acquisitions, and therefore clearer parameters
for successor liability under the FCPA are needed.”3 The letter,
claiming that the FCPA reduces merger and acquisition activity,
further explained that there “has been a chilling effect on legitimate
business activity” as a result of uncertain enforcement practices.4
In response, the Guidance pays close attention to FCPA enforce-
ment in mergers and acquisitions and takes a significant step
toward reducing uncertainty for businesses engaged in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. The Guidance, however, is not entirely
clear and still presents companies with significant legal questions
that they must weigh when considering cross-border transactions.
This Note argues that although the Guidance dramatically reduces
uncertainty in some instances, the FCPA still lacks clarity. To
increase clarity and transactional certainty, the DOJ and SEC
should provide additional clarification or include a provision that
1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT
DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [hereinafter
FCPA GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
2. Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al., to Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Robert Khuzami, Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n 1, 10-11 (Feb. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Chamber Letter], http://www.us
chamber.com/press/releases/2012/february/21-february-2012.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 2.
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grants safe harbor from successor liability for FCPA violations in
certain transactions.5 Such change is especially necessary in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, in which proper pre-acquisition
due diligence is inherently more difficult and sometimes
impossible.6
Part I presents the background of the FCPA and its impact on
mergers and acquisitions. Part II discusses how unanticipated
successor liability for FCPA issues can be difficult to discover and
can be a significant barrier to mergers and acquisitions (M&A)7
activity. This Part also notes the unique safe harbor from liability
that was granted for a transaction in 2008 and analyzes the 2012
Guideline’s expansion of this safe harbor. Part III argues that a
clear safe harbor provision should be added to the FCPA and
discusses how that provision should be structured, and Part IV
explains how a safe harbor provision, whether as extended in the
Guidance or as proposed in Part III, is good economic and legal
policy.
Some academics and practitioners have previously suggested the
possibility of a safe harbor as a solution to the FCPA’s successor
liability issues. Outside of this Note, none have examined the
potential operation and effect of such a change, and none have
discussed it with respect to the Agencies’ recent Guidance.8
I. BACKGROUND
A. FCPA Rules
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a federal law that
criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials by businesses or
5. See George J. Terwilliger III, Can the FCPA Be Good for Business?, NAT’L L.J. (2011)
(“[I]n most circumstances, the opportunity for the kind of in-depth examination that is likely
to reveal potential FCPA compliance issues is quite limited. As a result, any acquisition
abroad, and particularly those in emerging markets, can carry a ticking time bomb of FCPA
compliance issues.”).
6. See infra Part II.A.1.
7. “M&A” is used when it is the industry standard to do so.
8. For the most relevant, yet fleeting, discussions on an FCPA safe harbor in cross-border
mergers, see Terwilliger, supra note 5, and Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 299-300, 331 (2010).
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individuals that fall under the United States’s jurisdiction.9 To
prevent such corrupt practices, the FCPA requires companies to
maintain certain accounting standards.10 The primary way that a
company violates the FCPA is by making payments to foreign
officials or political parties for the purpose of influencing that
official or party to grant a business advantage to the payer of the
bribe.11 Although the law preserves certain exceptions and defenses
relating to normal business conduct,12 the main goal of the FCPA is
to prohibit the bribery of foreign officials.13
The FCPA is jointly enforced by the DOJ and the SEC.14 Both
Agencies co-authored and released the recent Guidance.15 Although
the FCPA was enacted in 1977, it has only recently risen to
prominence in the minds of dealmakers for multinational corpora-
tions. In 2004, the DOJ and the SEC initiated only five enforcement
actions; in 2010, the Agencies initiated a combined seventy-four
actions; and in 2011, forty-eight actions.16
Recent enforcement trends, combined with potentially huge
monetary penalties, have forced companies to take great care to
avoid potential FCPA liability or face severe consequences. In the
most stark example, Siemens paid $800 million in penalties for
FCPA violations in 2008, the highest penalty ever enforced for 
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -3 (2006); see Daniel
Margolis & James Wheaton, Non-U.S. Companies May Also Be Subject to the FCPA, FIN.
FRAUD L. REP., Sept. 2009, at 168, 168.
10. See Margolis & Wheaton, supra note 9, at 169..
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
12. Id. § 78dd-1(b) to (c). 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (“The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act ... was enacted for the purpose of making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and
entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining
business.”); FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 90 (“The FCPA was designed to prevent corrupt
practices, protect investors, and provide a fair playing field for those honest companies trying
to win business based on quality and price rather than bribes.”).
14. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Spotlight on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, http://www.sec.
gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml (last modified Nov. 14, 2012).
15. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
16. 2012 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 9, 2012),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2012MidYearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
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foreign misconduct.17 Eye-opening cases like this and others18 have
caused companies to take keen notice of the reality that FCPA
enforcement is a factor that businesses must consider in their
operations.19
B. Companies Subject to the FCPA
The FCPA is unique because it is a federal law traditionally
focused on U.S.-based companies, but it is also enforced on foreign
companies.20 The FCPA holds jurisdiction over companies that fall
under one of three categories: (1) companies that are organized
under the laws of the United States, which includes U.S. subsidiar-
ies of foreign-owned entities and U.S. nationals acting on behalf of
foreign companies;21 (2) all companies, including those that are
foreign-owned and operated, that issue stock or trade their securi-
ties in U.S. exchanges;22 and (3) any company that does not fit into
one of the previous two categories, but has violated the FCPA within
the territory of the United States.23
Combining these three categories, government enforcement of the
FCPA has a broad international reach, even where a U.S. claim to
jurisdiction might not seem obvious. For example, a Norwegian
company that bribed Iranian officials could be held liable because
it had securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange,24 or a
17. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
294.htm.
18. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Alcatel-Lucent with FCPA
Violations (Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-258.htm;
Press Release, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Daimler AG with Global Bribery (Apr.
1, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-51.htm. See generally U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified May 29, 2013).
19. See Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected by a U.S. Law Barring Bribes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at B1 (“[The Siemens] case was a real watershed. It woke up a lot of
people .... There had not been a lot of headline cases before that to make people sit up and
take notice.”).
20. Margolis & Wheaton, supra note 9, at 168.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h) (2006).
22. Id. § 78dd-1(a).
23. Id. § 78dd-3(a).
24. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Sanctions Statoil for Bribes to Iranian
Government Official (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-174.htm.
2013] AVOIDING FCPA SURPRISES 311
Taiwanese company could be liable for bribes to Taiwanese officials
because the bribes were authorized by an executive in the United
States.25 Recently, FCPA enforcement against Chinese companies
that list securities on U.S. stock exchanges has led many of these
companies to delist their securities to avoid potential litigation.26
C. FCPA Liability in Mergers and Acquisitions
The FCPA’s broad international reach, combined with the severe
penalties that violations can carry, creates a global business
environment that requires cognizance of potential FCPA liabilities.
This can have enormous implications in merger and acquisition
transactions, in which a target company’s liabilities become those
of the acquirer through successor liability.27 Successor liability
requires that, when one company acquires or merges with another,
the surviving successor company acquires the duties and liabilities
of the target company.28
Successor liability issues frequently depend on the way that a
deal is structured.29 In transactions that are structured as the
merger of two companies, in which the target company is assimi-
lated into the acquiring company, all liabilities of the target are
automatically borne by the acquirer upon completing the transac-
tion.30 In transactions that are structured as an asset sale, the
target company may sell specific business assets to the acquirer.31
Each asset and liability is negotiated prior to sale, and parties
frequently address who will assume liability for any issues that
25. SEC Obtains $500,000 Penalty Against Syncor International Corporation for Violat-
ing the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC v. Syncor Int’l
Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 17887 (Dec. 10, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr17887.htm [hereinafter SEC Obtains $500,000].
26. Richard L. Cassin, China Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, THE FCPA BLOG (July 27,
2012, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/7/27/china-companies-flee-us-exchanges.
html; Richard L. Cassin, China Companies Grow Skittish About U.S. Listings, THE FCPA
BLOG (Nov. 5, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/5/china-companies-
grow-skittish-about-us-listings.html.
27. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 28.
28. Id.
29. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 226 (3d ed. 2005).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 217.
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arise after the deal closes.32 Finally, in transactions that are
structured as a stock acquisition, the target company retains its
corporate structure, but becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer.33 In
this type of deal, the target company retains all of its liabilities.
Those liabilities, however, do not extend to the acquirer because it
is still an independent corporate entity, even though it now owns
the target company’s stock.34
While each of these deal structures might determine successor
liability differently, it is critical for the target company to determine
the existence and extent of any potential liability in each structure.
In a merger, the extent of liabilities will determine the risk that the
acquirer will be exposing itself to and may have a significant
bearing on the likelihood or the cost of the transaction.35 In asset
sales, potential liabilities can dramatically affect the value of an
asset, and negotiations regarding the assignment of those liabili-
ties—whether the acquirer will accept them or the target will
indemnify them—may significantly impact the asset price.36 In stock
acquisitions, potential liability may decrease the value of the target,
and the acquirer risks paying too much for a company that is full of
value-reducing liability issues.37
As the Guidance explained, “[s]uccessor liability applies to all
kinds of civil and criminal liabilities, and FCPA violations are no
exception.”38 Therefore, acquiring companies must be especially
careful as they “face additional risks because illegal practices ... [of]
the target could become the responsibility of the acquiring company
or the emerging entity.”39
A change in FCPA successor liability law is likely to have a large
impact on global business in its entirety. Cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, in which the FCPA is most likely to be enforced,
32. See id.
33. Id. at 226.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 200-01.
36. Id. at 217-18.
37. Id. at 226.
38. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 28 (footnote omitted).
39. KEVIN CORBETT ET AL., DELOITTE FORENSIC CTR., FCPA DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A 4
(2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Docu
ments/FAS_ForensicCenter_us_fas-us_dfc/us_dfc/us_dfc_FCPA_DD_MA_082009.pdf.
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accounts for 35 percent of all M&A deal volume.40 Further, mergers
and acquisitions in emerging markets, in which anti-corruption laws
are typically weaker and FCPA liability is more likely,41 account for
a full 25 percent of all M&A activity in 2011.42 This means that a
significant percentage of global M&A activity would benefit from
such a provision.
In FCPA violation cases, enforced penalties are not trivial, and
they increase the risk that companies face. Between 2002 and 2012,
the DOJ and the SEC brought charges for FCPA violations related
to M&A activity in fifteen transactions. The average penalty
imposed in these cases was $95 million, with a range from $300,000
to $579 million in penalties.43 In the same period, the SEC brought
a total of ninety-eight enforcement actions for all FCPA violations.44
Enforcement actions in the mergers and acquisitions context
accounted for more than 10 percent of all FCPA enforcements,
making it a very possible threat for many companies.
II. PROBLEM AND PARTIAL SOLUTION
A. Problem: Potential FCPA Liability Is a Significant Risk
1. Expensive Due Diligence Slows Transactions
To avoid successor liability issues, an acquiring firm must invest
in extensive due diligence to determine its potential liability for the
target company’s business practices. By investing sufficient
40. Valentina Pasquali, Value of Cross-Border M&A by Region and Country, GLOBAL FIN.,
http://www. gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/11932-value-of-cross-border-maa-
by-region-country.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
41. MICHAEL VOLKOV, WORLD COMPLIANCE, FCPA-MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 10 (2010),
http://worldcompliance.com/Libraries/WhitePapers/FCPA_Mergers_and_Acquisitions_Whi
te_paper.sflb.ashx; Terwilliger, supra note 5 (“In many of emerging markets, most acquisition
targets are beyond the purview of the FCPA and thus unlikely to employ anti-corruption
compliance policies. But these companies have become attractive targets because of their
position in growth markets. Those markets are also noted as typically more corrupt than
other, more established markets subject to closer scrutiny by governments.”).
42. Pasquali, supra note 40, at 10.
43. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, http://www.
sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified May 29, 2013).
44. See id.
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resources prior to acquisition, “a company may save itself the
considerable expense, distraction, and pain of future investigations
and prosecutions.”45 Indeed, the DOJ and the SEC recommend pre-
acquisition due diligence as the primary means for avoiding liability
in situations where an acquiring company suspects potential FCPA
violations in a target company.46
In practice, however, proper due diligence is not always feasible
because “[t]here is often little time to conduct appropriate or
adequate due diligence and the excitement around expanding the
company’s market share overshadows concerns of potential prob-
lems.”47 Furthermore, even in situations where companies recognize
the necessity for proper due diligence and are willing to commit
their monetary resources, significant barriers may still remain
because “[d]ue diligence can be time-consuming, since the relevant
information is not always easy to obtain.”48 In time-sensitive
transactions, the inability to conduct meaningful due diligence can
have a huge impact.
Regardless of an acquiring company’s willingness to commit both
the necessary financial resources and time to conduct traditionally
satisfactory due diligence, it may still face significant hurdles if a
target company is located in another country.49 Proper diligence can
be even more expensive and time-consuming in foreign countries
where important business information is not as easily accessible
45. What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Successor Liability Resulting from Inadequate
FCPA Due Diligence in M&A Transactions, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, (Mar. 2009),
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/b5e57b24-b95c-4007-8347-b92912ea4a49/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/81cbb19e-10a7-4cf6-a2d7-ec11759aa2d0/LT-030209-What-You-
Dont-Know-Can-Hurt-You-Liability-Inadequate-FCPA-Due-Diligen.pdf.
46. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 28.
47. Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 959-60 (2009).
48. Avoiding FCPA Violations in Investment Transactions-Transaction-Specific Measures-
Due Diligence, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. (West) § 5:42 (2d ed. Aug. 2013).
49. For examples of regional difficulties, see KROLL, THE CONTINUAL CHALLENGES OF DUE
DILIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1-2 (2011), http://www.krolladvisory.com/media/pdfs/The_
Continual_Challenges_of_DD_in_the_Middle_East_WP_040811P.pdf; Maarten Roos, Legal
Concerns of Foreign Companies in China, R&P CHINA LAWYERS (Feb. 2011), http://www.rp
lawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/20130217-Legal-Concerns-of-Foreign-Companies-in-
China.pdf; A NEW DAWN IN DEALMAKING: A REPORT ON RUSSIAN M&A ACTIVITY, 19 (Mikhail
Rymanov et al. eds., 2010), http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/GBLP_Russia_Oct_2010.pdf;
Shanti Salas, Brazil: FDI Opportunities and Pitfalls, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (June 16, 2008),
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=2506.
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because information may only be available from unwilling parties,
from closed government records, or from outdated public records.50
This reality means U.S. companies may be at a severe business
disadvantage if the target company is located in a foreign country
that does not promote pre-acquisition due diligence, or if the
transaction is hostile in nature and the target is not legally
obligated to provide information. Diligence in these transactions can
be extremely difficult because “[r]ather than investigating its own
personnel, facilities and accounting records, a potential acquirer
conducting FCPA due diligence of a non-related entity investigates
a company beyond its control and informational expertise.”51
Making these transactions even more difficult, an acquiring
company’s pre-acquisition diligence does not end with simply
discovering a potential liability. Even if due diligence uncovers some
potential FCPA liability, costs of further investigation can increase
dramatically as traditional M&A diligence becomes more like an
internal investigation of corrupt practices.52 Finally, upon initial
discovery and subsequent investigation, an acquiring company must
report suspected violations and may find “the benefits of such
diligence are uncertain and usually unknowable.”53
2. Companies May Be Forced to Abandon Deals
Companies invest so much into due diligence because it may be
the difference between a successful deal and one that brings
crippling penalties. Diligence is often the only means to gauge the
outcome. In circumstances, however, where due diligence is
especially time-consuming, expensive, or inherently difficult,
companies sometimes must face the decision of whether to abandon
a deal or risk unexpected liability. According to practitioner Daniel
Grimm, “[b]usiness entities are likely to respond to this uncertainty
with an over-abundance of caution, resulting in universally higher
transaction costs and the occasional abandoned deal.”54
50. See supra note 48.
51. Grimm, supra note 8, at 294.
52. See Recent FCPA Enforcement Actions Involving Internal Investigations—The M&A
Context, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. (West) § 12:2 (2d ed. Aug. 2013).
53. Chamber Letter, supra note 2, at 6.
54. Grimm, supra note 8, at 296.
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In some situations, the burden of proper due diligence may be
considerable in comparison to the total value of the transaction, and
when the costs of managing this uncertainty subsume the expected
value of a transaction, a company is likely to abandon the deal.55
Even when a company has invested in uncovering potential FCPA
violations, the discovery of any misconduct may further hamper
acquisition efforts. “In such cases, the planned M&A transactions
have been put on hold pending investigation of suspected violations
and resolution of the issues with the government.”56
In the most prominent acquisition abandoned over FCPA
liabilities, the proposed merger between Titan Corp. and Lockheed
Martin (Lockheed), Lockheed invested in due diligence and uncov-
ered potential corrupt practices by the target company, Titan.57
After lowering the price and extending its deal timeline twice,
Lockheed eventually abandoned the deal because government
investigations had not been resolved in a timely manner.58 Although
Lockheed’s decision to abandon its pursuit of Titan was well-
publicized, any prospective acquirer must consider abandonment
when faced with potential liabilities. The acquirer must additionally
recognize that “not all FCPA issues may be identified in due
diligence and an acquirer may need to remedy any issues post-
closing.”59 In fact, numerous cases exist in which FCPA penalties
55. See Daniel J. Plaine & Judith A. Lee, Making the Way for International Business
Integrity and Compliance Due Diligence in Cross Border Acquisitions, METRO. CORP. COUNS.,
May 2007, at 9 (“If the identified risks of successor liability or future non-compliance cannot
be reasonably avoided, shared or mitigated, the U.S. acquirer might be required to step away
from the deal.”); see also Wendy B. Davis, De Facto Merger, Federal Common Law, and Erie:
Constitutional Issues in Successor Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 529, 537 (“If acquiring
corporations cannot determine with certainty the liabilities and obligations of the target for
which they will become responsible, the transaction is less likely to be consummated. The
costs of aborting a merger are substantial.”).
56. High-Risk Transactions Under the FCPA-Mergers And Acquisitions, 1 FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. (West) § 11:30 (2d ed. Aug. 2013).
57. See Recent FCPA Enforcement Actions Involving Internal Investigations-The M&A
Context-Lockheed/Titan, 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Reporter (West) § 12:4 (2d ed. Aug.
2013).
58. Id.
59. Frank Aquila et al., What You Need to Know About the FCPA Before You Do Your Next
Deal, 16 M&A LAWYER 3, 7 (2012), http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/fc044cd3-0854-
4003-be20-4e8f3f9c98dd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/18640370-f7bb-4e90-b395-
5279887a10d7/Aquila-Veeraraghavan-Lee_M%26A-Lawyer_July-Aug_2012.pdf.
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either delayed an acquisition or were enforced after the transaction
was complete.60
3. Select Case Studies61
a. Pre-Acquisition Issues
In December of 2002, the SEC settled enforcement issues against
Syncor International Corporation for FCPA violations.62 These
violations, and the necessary subsequent investigation became
apparent to the acquirer, Cardinal Health Inc., however, only five
days prior to the merger.63 Consequently, on the first day of the
merger, Cardinal Health had to “announce an internal investigation
rather than celebrate its first day as a new company.”64
Issues disclosed prior to the transaction also can cause significant
delays. In October of 2003, a syndicated investment group sought to
acquire subsidiaries of ABB Ltd., a Swiss corporation with subsid-
iaries in the United States, but pre-acquisition due diligence
revealed numerous potential FCPA violations by the target
companies.65 The following investigation, government reporting, and
resolution delayed the acquisition by nine months and resulted in
penalties against the target.66
In February of 2005, the SEC filed charges against Invision
Technologies, Inc. during its acquisition by the General Electric
Company.67 Although this deal eventually succeeded, the merger
60. See generally David S. Krakoff et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: FCPA Due
Diligence in the Context of Mergers and Acquisitions, 4 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 101 (2009).
61. Most of the SEC’s and the DOJ’s cases against corporations for FCPA violations have
ended in settlement, so case opinions in the discussed cases do not exist. The primary sources
for each of these cases are the litigation press releases issued by the enforcing agencies. 
62. SEC Obtains $500,000, supra note 25. 
63. See Krakoff, supra note 60, at 107.
64. Id. at 113.
65. See id. at 102.
66. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Opinion Procedure Release No. 04-02 (Dep’t
of Justice July 12, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0402.pdf.
67. SEC Settles Charges Against InVision Technologies for $1.1 Million for Violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC v. GE InVision, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 19078
(Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19078.htm.
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was delayed because the agreement between the companies
required resolution of FCPA issues before closing.68
b. Post-Acquisition Issues 
Post-acquisition issues can be even more troublesome for
businesses and dealmakers. In 1998, KBR Inc. became a subsidiary
of Halliburton Co. (Halliburton).69 After the merger, however, KBR
continued to carry on corrupt practices from 1998 until 2006 that
Halliburton “failed to detect or prevent.”70 As a result, the SEC
required both companies to jointly pay a hefty $579 million fine.71
In 2001, the energy companies Coastal Corporation and El Paso
Corporation merged. But in 2007, long after the completion of the
merger, the SEC brought charges based on a kickback scheme that
began at Coastal in 2000, prior to the merger, and continued for
over a year after the merger.72 The SEC claimed El Paso either
“knew, or was reckless in not knowing” about these violations and
held El Paso liable because the misconduct continued after the
merger.73
In another instance, the SEC charged Tyco International (Tyco)
with numerous securities-related violations in 2006.74 One charge
included Tyco’s failure to investigate or remedy any potential
misconduct in the course of its acquisition of Earth Tech Brazil,
even though Tyco had conducted “due diligence revealing that
improper payments to government officials were common in Brazil
and seen as necessary in Earth Tech’s line of business.”75 Tyco’s
68. See Krakoff, supra note 60, at 105.
69. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for
FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. SEC Files Settled Books and Records and Internal Controls Charges Against El Paso
Corporation for Improper Payments to Iraq Under the U.N. Oil for Food Program—Company
Agrees to Pay $7.7 Million, SEC v. El Paso Comp., SEC Litig. Release No. 19991 (Feb. 7,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19991.htm.
73. Id.
74. See SEC Brings Settled Charges Against Tyco International Ltd. Alleging Billion
Dollar Accounting Fraud, SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., SEC Litig. Release No. 19657 (Apr. 17, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19657.htm.
75. Krakoff, supra note 60, at 109.
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failure to investigate and remedy corrupt practices in this acquisi-
tion and others led to an SEC penalty of $50 million.76
Finally, even where companies discover and report violations pre-
acquisition, the acquirer may ultimately bear the penalties post-
acquisition. In 2007, the Monsanto Corporation sought to acquire
the Delta & Pine Land Company. During its pre-acquisition
diligence, Monsanto discovered potential FCPA violations at Delta
and reported them to the SEC.77 Shortly after the completion of the
acquisition, the SEC enforced a penalty Delta and Monsanto paid
jointly.78
In each of these cases, and in others like them involving issues
arising before and after acquisition,79 FCPA enforcement hampered
M&A activity by either delaying the transaction, causing a company
to abandon the transaction, or bringing an unexpected penalty post-
closing. For companies considering acquisition strategies, all three
of these possible outcomes pose risks that increase transaction costs
and make M&A activity less attractive. Further, though the SEC
reports on the total number of enforcement actions it brings in
FCPA cases,80 compiling empirical data on the number of deals that
companies abandon at the early stages of business planning, for fear
of potential liability or high costs of diligence, seems an impossible
task.
76. Id. at 110.
77. See id. at 104.
78. See Delta & Pine and Turk Deltaphine Agree to Pay a $300,000 Penalty to Settle
FCPA Charges, SEC v. Delta et al., Litig. Release No. 20214 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20214.htm.
79. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 60, at 107 (discussing Statoil’s acquisition of Norsk
Hydro); SEC v. ENI et al., Litig. Release No. 21588 (July 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21588.htm (discussing Snamprogetti’s acqui-
sition of ENI); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Pfizer with FCPA
Violations (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-152.htm
(discussing Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth).
80. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 14.
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B. Partial Solution: A Safe Harbor in Opinion Procedure Release
08-02
In a case heralded as “groundbreaking,”81 Halliburton found a
unique solution to the issue of uncertain potential FCPA successor
liability in an acquisition. In 2008, Halliburton sought to acquire
Expro International Group (Expro), an oil and gas company based
in the United Kingdom and operating in fifty countries, including
the United States.82 Due to the United Kingdom’s laws surrounding
the time-pressured transaction, in which Halliburton was one of
several competitive bidders, Halliburton could win the acquisition
only by submitting an unconditional bid for the target company.83
This meant the acquisition could not be contingent on satisfactory
completion of FCPA due diligence, and if it won the acquisition,
Halliburton would assume all unknown liabilities.84 Recognizing
that it might be taking a huge risk by making such an unconditional
bid, Halliburton sought the opinion of the DOJ by requesting an
agency opinion that addressed three questions: (1) Would the
transaction itself violate the FCPA?; (2) Would Halliburton inherit
liabilities for FCPA violations by Expro prior to the acquisition?;
and (3) Would Halliburton be held liable for any misconduct by
Expro that occurred after the completion of the merger, but before
the completion of FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence, if
Halliburton identified and disclosed such conduct to the DOJ within
180 days of closing?85
The resulting DOJ response, Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-
02, has been a hallmark of FCPA enforcement. The Agency re-
sponded to Halliburton by allowing an unprecedented offer of safe
harbor from FCPA prosecution for liabilities that arose from the
81. Andrew M. Baker et al., DOJ Releases Groundbreaking FCPA Opinion, BAKER BOTTS
LLP (June 23, 2008), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/DOJReleasesGroundbreaking
FCPAOpinion.htm.
82. See TIMOTHY L. DICKINSON ET AL., PAUL HASTINGS, DOJ ISSUES OPINION ON POST-
ACQUISITION DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (July 2008), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/
publications/954.pdf?wt.mc_ID=954.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02 (Dep’t
of Justice June 13, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf
[hereinafter Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02].
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transaction.86 The most unique aspect of this opinion letter was that
the DOJ promised not to penalize Halliburton for any violations
that occurred during the 180 days post closing if Halliburton
disclosed violations to the DOJ.87 The DOJ also provided a firm
disclosure schedule for Halliburton to meet. High-risk due diligence
had to be complete within 90 days of closing medium risk due
diligence had to be complete within 120 days; and low risk due
diligence had to be complete within 180 days.88
This meant the government promised to forgive not only corrup-
tion by the target company before the transaction but also miscon-
duct that occurred within Halliburton itself as a result of the
merger, after the acquisition had been completed.89 Perhaps
recognizing the need to not limit United States companies in their
business efforts abroad, the government’s justifications for this “safe
harbor” are highly favorable to acquiring companies:
Under the circumstances here ... there is insufficient time and
inadequate access to complete appropriate pre-acquisition FCPA
due diligence and remediation. [The Acquirer] has no legal
ability to require a specified level of due diligence or to insist
upon remedial measures until after the acquisition is completed.
As a result, [its] ability to take action to prevent unlawful
payments by Target or its personnel during the period immedi-
ately after the closing has been severely compromised.90
This decision facilitated Halliburton’s acquisition in a competitive
environment and allowed it to go forward in the transaction with a
certain consideration of the risk of FCPA liability.
Although Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02 provides the most
specific instructions for complying with a safe harbor provision, the
Halliburton case is not the only situation where the Agencies have
been willing to provide some leniency. In a similarly rushed
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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transaction, the DOJ allowed Pfizer to disclose violations post-
closing even though the target was a United States company.91
C. 2012 FCPA Guidance
1. Promotion of a Safe Harbor
The 2012 FCPA Guidance should be considered a significant
progression toward an FCPA enforcement regime that is committed
to facilitating mergers and acquisitions. First, the guidance confirms
the Agencies will not bring penalties against acquiring companies
based on corruption by a target company if that target company was
not previously subject to the FCPA. As the Guidance explains,
“Successor liability does not, however, create liability where none
existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a foreign
company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction,
the mere acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively
create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer.”92 For companies
considering acquisitions in countries where corruption is more
prevalent, the Agencies’ promise not to prosecute for prior miscon-
duct provides quite clear reassurance.
But assurance that the acquirer will not be held liable for the
target’s previous misconduct does not address the risk that unde-
tected misconduct may continue after the deal has closed and the
acquirer has assumed all potential liabilities. In addressing this
concern, the Guidance discusses three hypothetical transactions
where a target company was not previously subject to the FCPA.93
In Scenario 1, the acquirer conducts extensive due diligence.94 In
the course of its diligence, the acquirer discovers corrupt practices
91. DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C.2-6, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp.
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
pfizer/2012-08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf (“When such anti-corruption due diligence is appropriate but
not practicable prior to acquisition of a new business for reasons beyond Pfizer's control, or
due to any applicable law, rule, or regulation, Pfizer has conducted and will conduct anti-
corruption due diligence subsequent to the acquisition and report to the Department any
corrupt payments.”).
92. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 28.
93. See id. at 31-32. 
94. See id. at 31.
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in the target company.95 Immediately after closing, the acquirer
reports the misconduct to the DOJ and the SEC and remedies the
practices completely through proper compliance programs.96 In this
case, the acquirer would not be liable for pre-acquisition misconduct,
and the acquirer’s “extensive pre-acquisition due diligence allowed
it to identify and halt the corruption. As there was no continuing
misconduct post-acquisition, the FCPA was not violated.”97
In Scenario 2, the target again is a foreign company not previ-
ously subject to the FCPA.98 In this scenario, however, the acquirer
performs minimal pre-acquisition due diligence and does not make
a full effort to institute a compliance program after closing.99
Several months after closing, company officers begin to suspect
misconduct in the target’s practices, which continues for another
two years before being reported to the DOJ and the SEC.100 In this
case, the acquirer would be liable for the misconduct that occurred
post-acquisition presumably because the acquirer did not invest
enough effort in pre-acquisition diligence and because the miscon-
duct was not reported in a timely manner.101 In both of these
scenarios, the Agencies focus on encouraging pre-acquisition due
diligence as the primary means of avoiding successor liability.
Finally, Scenario 3 addresses the situation where the target
company is located in a country where the acquirer has limited
ability to conduct pre-acquisition due diligence.102 In this scenario,
the acquirer recognizes that the target company is engaged in
business in countries or industries where corruption is likely, but is
unable to discover any misconduct despite its best efforts to conduct
reasonable due diligence.103 In this situation, the Agencies provide
the widest latitude by openly extending the safe harbor provided in
Halliburton’s 2008 acquisition. According to the Guidance, acquiring
“[c]ompanies can follow the measures set forth in Opinion Procedure
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 31-32.
101. See id. at 32.
102. See id.
103. See id.
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Release No. 08-02, or seek their own opinions, where adequate pre-
acquisition due diligence is not possible.”104
For companies considering foreign acquisitions, the guidance
provided in Scenario 3 is significant because it represents the first
time that the DOJ and the SEC have explicitly extended the
provisions of Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02 to any transac-
tion in similar circumstances. For acquiring companies, this should
provide significant reassurances that if they invest a reasonable
effort in due diligence and post-acquisition compliance, they will be
able to avoid major liability. As discussed in Part IV, this dramati-
cally reduces uncertainty, which allows U.S. companies to engage in
more M&A activity.105
The guidance provided in Scenario 3, however, is less than perfect
and is inherently bound by the limitations that exist in the provi-
sions of Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02, which some commen-
tators have called “draconian[,] ... rushed,”106 and “onerous”107
because the specific post-acquisition disclosure schedule is inflexible
and based only on what is acceptable to the DOJ.
2. Lingering Uncertainty
Despite providing the possibility of safe harbor in transactions,
the Guidance still retains uncertainty for companies considering
these transactions. The guidance provided in Scenario 3 suggests
that companies may either follow the requirements provided in
Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02 or seek their own opinions
from the Agencies, but the Guidance does not provide any other
discussion regarding how or when a company should pursue these
options.108 Companies in this situation must guess between
following the strict schedule of Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02
or requesting their own opinion, which carries with it uncertainties
104. Id.
105. See infra Part IV.
106. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, NEW DOJ OPINION EXPANDS OPTIONS FOR MINIMIZING FCPA
RISK IN INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 2 (2008), http://www.arnoldporter.
com/resources/documents/CA_NewDOJOpinion_071708.pdf.
107. GARY DIBIANCO & COLLEEN P. MAHONEY, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM
LLP, DOJ CONFIRMS APPROPRIATENESS OF RISK-BASED FCPA TRANSACTIONAL DUE DILIGENCE
(2008), www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/DOJ.pdf.
108. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 32.
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of timeliness and outcome. Because it does not provide further
clarification, “the resource guide leaves plenty of uncertainty about
enforcement. One result is that companies will continue to need
outside legal counsel to help navigate in this area—at a hefty
cost.”109
III. COMPLETE SOLUTION: A SAFE HARBOR PROVISION IN THE FCPA
A. Uncertainty Creates Need for Consistency
In light of the limitations and uncertainty in the Agencies’
Guidance on successor liability, the FCPA itself should be amended
to include a provision that automatically extends safe harbor
protections in certain transactions. The provision would be modeled
after Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02, but would address its
limitations and apply recent departures from its strict disclosure
schedule.110 This provision could take effect as guidance similar to
the 2012 Guidance, again published jointly by the DOJ and the
SEC. But the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform has argued
that with proposals such as this, when “the FCPA is ripe for much
needed clarification and reform through improvements to the
existing statute[,] ... [s]uch improvements ... are best suited for
Congressional action.”111
109. Peter J. Henning, In Bribery Law, the Watchword is Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Nov. 15, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/in-bribery-law-
the-watchword-is-uncertainty/.
110. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9-11, United States v. Data Sys. & Solutions,
LLC, No. 1:12-CR-262 (E.D.V.A. June 18, 2012) [hereinafter Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
Data Systems], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/data-systems/
2012-06-18-data-systems-dpa.pdf (granting deferred prosecution contingent on implementing
a two-year remediation program and reporting progress at regular intervals); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement ¶¶ 10-12, United States v. Bizjet Int’l Sales & Support, Inc., No. 12-
CR-61CVE (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Bizjet],
available at http://www.mainjustice.com/wp-admin/documents-databases/293-2-Deferred-
Prosecution-Agreement.pdf (granting deferred prosecution contingent on implementing a
three-year remediation plan).
111. ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, THE U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 7 (2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/restoring balance_
fcpa.pdf. “There is evidence that Congress may be open to such a proposal. In 1988, the United
States House of Representatives proposed adding a similar ‘safe harbor’ to the FCPA, which
would have shielded companies that established procedures that were ‘reasonabl[y] expected
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B. A Proposed Safe Harbor Provision
1. Provision Text
The following is a proposed amendment to the FCPA that would
provide safe harbor in certain transactions:
A) Types of protections granted
1) Any issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to
file reports under section 780(d) of this title and is engaged
in a corporate acquisition of a separate corporate entity
will be eligible for immunity from enforcement actions for
pre-acquisition violations of this title committed by the
target company, provided that the acquiring company:
a) reports such violations as quickly as is reasonably
practicable following the closing of the acquisition
transaction, and
b) promptly institutes a full remediation program to
correct such violations and prevent subsequent
violations.
2) Any issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to
file reports under section 780(d) of this title and is engaged
in a corporate acquisition of a separate corporate entity
will be eligible for immunity from enforcement actions for
any post-acquisition violations of this title during the
twelve months immediately following closing of the acquisi-
tion transaction, provided that the acquiring company:
a) reports such violations as quickly as is reasonably
practicable after closing of the acquisition transac-
tion,
b) remedies such violations as soon as they reason-
ably can be stopped, and
c) completes due diligence and remediation, including
completion of investigation of any issues that are
identified, by not later than one year from the date of
closing of the acquisition transaction.
to prevent and detect’ FCPA violation from vicarious liability for FCPA violations of
employees.” Id. at 93 n.44.
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B) General Requirements
1) An acquiring company may receive the immunity
outlined in Section A(1) and (2) only if the acquisition
transaction is conducted under circumstances where
reasonable due diligence is not feasible due to any combi-
nation of the following factors:
a) significant time sensitivity, such that the time
required to conduct reasonable due diligence would
not allow the acquiring company to complete the
transaction,
b) regulations in the country where the target com-
pany is located that prevent reasonable due diligence,
or
c) market characteristics or information deficiencies
in the country or region where the target company is
located that prevent reasonable due diligence.
2) An acquiring company may not receive the immunity
outlined in section A(1) and (2) if any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such company knowingly plays a role
in the violation of this title.
3) A target company may not receive the immunity out-
lined in section A(1) and (2) in order to intentionally avoid
enforcement actions for identified misconduct through
merger and acquisition activity. Under this requirement,
the target company cannot receive immunity if violations
of this title occur with the intent to avoid penalties through
future sale of the company.
a) As an exception to Section B(3), this requirement
does not apply to target companies that were not
subject to the FCPA prior to acquisition.
4) The acquiring company bears the burden of proving to
the government’s satisfaction:
a) the acquiring company implemented reasonable
efforts to conduct pre-acquisition due diligence in an
effort to discover potential FCPA liability, and
b) all post-acquisition disclosure and remediation was
implemented and conducted by the acquiring com-
pany as quickly as reasonably practicable.
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2. Hypothetical Provision Explained
Section A of this statute seeks to follow the provisions of Opinion
Procedure Release No. 08-02, with some significant changes. First,
following deferred prosecution agreements granted in other similar
cases,112 an acquiring company would be required to make all
disclosures within a period that is reasonably practicable,113 and
remedy any violations within a one year period.114 This would still
place a burden on acquiring companies to invest dedicated efforts to
discover and remedy corruption, but the amendment’s flexibility
would recognize that misconduct may be very difficult or very easy
to identify and address in differing transactions.
Section B(1) of the statute specifies that this safe harbor provision
is only available in unique circumstances in which an acquiring firm
is unable to conduct proper due diligence because of limited time or
the characteristics of the target’s business operations. Sections B(2)
and B(3) are intended to ensure that this provision is not used to
intentionally commit FCPA violations and avoid liability. Without
this section, a company subject to the FCPA could knowingly allow
profitable corrupt practices, then sell or merge the company for the
112. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Data Systems supra note 110, at 4-5; Thomas R. Fox,
The DOJ Listens: The Evolution of FCPA Compliance in M&A, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS
BLOG (June 20, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2012/06/20/the-doj-listens-
the-evolution-of-fcpa-compliance-in-ma/; see DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note
91; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 5, United States v. Johnson & Johnson, No.
1-11-CR-99-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution_agreements/pdf/johnson.pdf.
113. The phrase “reasonably practical” appears to be favored by the enforcing agencies, as
it appears repeatedly in recent deferred prosecution agreements (DPA). In this hypothetical
provision, this phrase is intentionally subject to interpretation, permitting the enforcing
agency to retain control in setting what it deems to be appropriate remediation and reporting
schedules, while also recognizing that the necessary timetables may vary widely depending
on circumstances. A likely timeframe for these disclosures might range from 90 days post-
close, as in Halliburton’s obligation to disclose egregious violations, to 18 months, as in
Johnson & Johnson’s obligation to conduct full FCPA audits.
114. See PAUL T. FRIEDMAN ET AL., MORRISON & FOERSTER, FCPA + ANTI-CORRUPTION
DEVELOPMENTS: 2012 END OF SUMMER ROUND-UP (2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Up
loads/Images/121010-FCPA-Anti-Corruption-Developments.pdf (“[N]otably, DOJ seems to be
relaxing the timeline for conducting such diligence when compared to the strict requirements
set forth in the Halliburton Opinion Procedure Release 08-02, which set forth aggressive
deadlines for conducting a post-close review and reporting findings.”).
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sole purpose of avoiding penalties, thereby dodging all consequences.
The exception in section (B)(3)(a) exists because if a company was
not previously subject to the FCPA pre-merger, and intentionally
commits violations, it would not be liable for those violations. This
exception recognizes that a target company should not be liable for
violating a foreign jurisdiction’s law that it was not subject to, even
if that violation was intentional. Further, the (B)(3)(a) exception
exists to encourage target companies that might intentionally
violate the FCPA to conform to the FCPA through merger. The
promise not to prosecute creates an incentive to merge and institute
compliance remedies, rather than a reason to continue misconduct
with impunity.115
3. Comparison with Other Laws
The idea of a safe harbor in certain transactions, as extended in
the Guidance and proposed here, is not unique to corruption law. In
several other areas of law, safe harbor provisions are provided to
reconcile differing legal regimes and encourage business practices
where disparate rules might otherwise make transactions less
likely.
In the field of export law, the United States and the European
Union take different approaches to data protection and personal
privacy.116 Without a safe harbor provision, the E.U.’s stricter law
“would prohibit the transfer of personal data to non-European
Union countries that do not meet the European Union ... ‘adequacy’
standard for privacy protection.”117 But the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor
Program acts “to bridge these differences in approach and provide
a streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply with the [E.U.
law].”118 The Safe Harbor Program creates a presumption of
compliance that allows transactions to continue unchallenged and
balances strict enforcement with business operation.119 Like the
115. See infra Part IV.B.
116. See Welcome to the U.S.-E.U. & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (last updated Apr. 11, 2012).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Robert R. Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and Its
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 2780 (2002)
(“Under the Safe Harbor agreement, U.S. firms agree to abide by basic ... principles .... Those
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U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Program, the FCPA safe harbor proposed
here also should have a presumption of compliance that is intended
to facilitate transactions.
Similarly, health care law includes a safe harbor provision with
respect to fraud and abuse in anti-kickback laws.120 The purpose of
this safe harbor provision is to promote valuable, “non-abusive”
mergers that may be within the scope of the Anti-Kickback
statute.121 Likewise, the FCPA’s safe harbor provision should be
designed to avoid penalizing productive M&A activity where
egregious misconduct has not occurred.
Further, the U.K. Bribery Act is considered by many to be an even
stricter anti-corruption law than the FCPA,122 but it does not enforce
successor liability. Rather, it “limits an acquiring company’s liability
to the date of the closing, when it became ‘associated’ with the
target entity. Under the Act, an acquiring company is liable only for
ongoing bribery that continues after the acquisition, as opposed to
any historic conduct.”123 This is similar to the guarantee provided in
the Guidance that the DOJ and the SEC will not prosecute an
acquirer for a target’s misconduct prior to acquisition. It also seems
to extend leniency to the target company after acquisition because
any penalty against the target company post-acquisition would
that do so will be presumed to provide ‘adequate protection,’ and the European ... authorities
will allow their [transactions] to continue unchallenged. [Authorities] fear the agreement
might be too lenient, especially concerning enforcement. U.S. companies fear the agreement
might be too strict.”).
120. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the
Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518 (Nov. 19, 2009) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001).
121. Id.
122. See Ben Kerschberg, FCPA-Inspired UK Bribery Act Projected to Hit the Oil and Gas
Industry Hardest, FORBES (May 20, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/
05/20/fcpa-inspired-uk-bribery-act-projected-to-hit-the-oil-and-gas-industry-hardest/; Mike
Koehler, UK Bribery Act: Sensible and Senseless, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 25, 2011), http://fcpa
professor.blogspot.com/2011/04/uk-bribery-act-sensible-and-senseless.html; WYNN H. SEGALL
ET AL., AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, UK BRIBERY ACT RAISES THE BAR ON FCPA
STANDARDS FOR ANTIBRIBERY COMPLIANCE (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.cdn.akingump.com/
images/content/6/7/v4/6732/100802-UK-Bribery-Act-Raises-the-Bar-on-FCPA-Standards-for-
Antib.pdf.
123. Matthew J. Freeley, Successor Liability Can Be Limited Before Acquisition Is Made,
DAILY BUS. REV. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.bipc.com/files/Publication/d759195c-9121-4536-
929f-c20208d54a82/Preview/PublicationAttachment/438706e5-296c-4908-9da7-
c2e7cffd397b/100031203%20Buchanan.pdf.
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ultimately be borne by the acquirer. The proposed FCPA provision
would similarly shelter the acquirer from liability that may exist in
the target immediately following closing.
Finally, the SEC and the DOJ themselves each have programs
that grant leniency under certain conditions when a company self-
reports misconduct.124 Because the Agencies focus on self-reporting
when determining leniency in these situations,125 the Agencies
should be equally willing to grant leniency when an acquirer reports
misconduct that it was not aware of and made diligent efforts to
prevent and correct.
C. The Proposed Safe Harbor Provision in Practice
The proposed safe harbor provision would apply most clearly in
transactions similar to Scenario 3 discussed in the Guidance. In this
situation, the acquiring company is unable to conduct proper due
diligence on the target due to local law. The acquirer, however, 
would first satisfy the safe harbor provision by showing that it made
every reasonable attempt at conducting proper due diligence, but
that it was unable to do so because of the local laws.
As an example, upon closing the acquisition, the acquirer might
have some suspicion of misconduct in the target, which is now part
of the surviving company. The acquirer begins full FPCA due
diligence immediately in order to satisfy the requirement that an
investigation be conducted as quickly as reasonably practicable.
Hypothetically, in the course of its internal investigation, the
acquirer discovers that the target conducted corrupt practices for
several years prior to acquisition. The acquirer immediately
124. Enforcement Cooperation Initiative, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N COOPERATION INITIATIVE,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2013); Leniency
Program , U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST LENIENCY PROGRAM, http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/criminal/leniency.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
125. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf (stating that leniency is contingent on
reporting misconduct with completeness and candor); Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 44969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (“Self-policing, self-reporting, re-
mediation and cooperation with law enforcement authorities, among other things, are
unquestionably important.”).
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initiates a compliance program and reports this misconduct to the
DOJ and the SEC, and the Agencies would decline to prosecute.
A short time later, the acquiring company discovers that some
corrupt practices of the target are still being conducted within the
operations of the surviving company. Again, the acquirer immedi-
ately reports to the DOJ and the SEC and institutes compliance
efforts to remedy the misconduct. Upon the showing of the acquir-
er’s reasonable and timely efforts, the DOJ and the SEC would
decline to prosecute and would allow the acquirer up to twelve
months after the acquisition to completely remedy the misconduct.
IV. A SAFE HARBOR PROVISION WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH
BUSINESSES AND THE GOVERNMENT
A. Benefits for Companies
1. Lower Transaction Costs 
Whether in a definitive codified provision, as suggested above or
as extended in the Guidance, allowing some form of safe harbor
from FCPA enforcement penalties in certain transactions is good
policy from the perspective of both business and law enforcement.
First, a safe harbor provision lowers transaction costs in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions because it reduces the cost of due
diligence and subsequent investigation for FCPA violations.
As discussed above, the cost of due diligence is directly related to
the amount of risk a company faces when considering a
transaction.126 Because of this, one of the primary effects the FCPA
has on mergers and acquisitions is that it increases transaction
costs through increased due diligence efforts that are intended to
mitigate such risk.127
In some deals, however, a high risk of FCPA violations requires
a company to decide between investing more in due diligence or
126. See supra Part II.
127. N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, THE
FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS—SHOULD ANYTHING BE
DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING
OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? 1, 2-3 (Dec. 2011), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPA
ImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf.
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abandoning a deal, which can have negative economic consequences.
As explained by Daniel Grimm:
In the M&A arena, the risk that due diligence may fail to protect
an acquirer from successor liability for FCPA violations may
require deciding whether to pour more resources into the due
diligence effort or to simply abandon the transaction. In some
cases, the escalating costs of mitigating uncertain risks may
have the undesirable effect of deterring a wealth-maximizing
transaction, thus creating generalized economic losses.128
A safe harbor rule, however, removes the need to compensate for
uncertainty with expensive due diligence, decreasing the costs of
these types of transactions because companies are able to pursue
transactions with greater assurance that even if violations exist,
they will not be penalized for those violations if otherwise compli-
ant. A safe harbor provision allows companies to fully understand
the requirements for compliance and approach transactions with
more confidence that they will be able to satisfy such requirements.
Ultimately, the certainty of compliance requirements, provided by
a safe harbor provision, would reduce transaction costs that are
related to uncertainty.129
Reducing uncertainty would be beneficial to companies because
unexpected successor liability, which may arise in situations in
which it is not possible to conduct proper due diligence, can have a
damaging economic effect. As the Second Circuit noted in the
concurrence to New York v. National Services Industries Inc., “A rule
of successor liability that threatened good-faith buyers with huge,
unpredictable liability would also impose serious systemic costs on
the economy. Such a rule would depress the price purchasers would
be willing to pay for assets, as buyers would risk acquiring massive
hidden liability.”130 But a safe harbor provision can be a powerful
tool to decrease transaction costs by reducing uncertainty and risk.
128. Grimm, supra note 8, at 297.
129. Cf. LORIE SRIVASTAVA & SANDRA S. BATIE, GREAT LAKES PROTECTION FUND, THE
EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
(Jan. 2002), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/deq-ogl-mglpf-tmdls_249
819_7.pdf (“[T]he regulator may also wish to reduce these significant ... transaction costs
associated with compliance uncertainty by increasing compliance certainty.”).
130. 352 F.3d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 2003) (Leval, J., concurring). 
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As explained by one author, “[T]he development of a safe harbor
from successor liability for business entities performing FCPA due
diligence that satisfies the guidelines would calm market nerves
and facilitate compliance without jeopardizing beneficial M&A
transactions.”131
2. Facilitating Mergers and Acquisitions
By reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, a safe harbor
provision allows U.S. companies to be more competitive in the global
market because it “tip[s] the balance toward overseas expansion by
reducing the risk of hidden FCPA liability.”132 In Opinion Procedure
Release No. 08-02 and in the Guidance, the Agencies’ extension of
the safe harbor shows a commitment to facilitating innocuous
business transactions:
[F]or United States companies that are contemplating cross-
border merger and acquisition deals involving FCPA issues, the
granting of a “grace period” represents an extremely significant
attempt to reconcile the Department’s law enforcement objec-
tives with the need of the United States business community to
be able to compete internationally on a level playing field.133
The net impact of a safe harbor is that it allows U.S. companies
to conduct more mergers and acquisitions, which in the aggregate
facilitates more activity in the market for corporate control, allows
willing participants of market transactions to engage in voluntary
mergers and acquisitions, and allocates resources through efficient
mergers.
A safe harbor provision also reduces the chilling effect on cross-
border deals. Without a safe harbor, the total result of increasing
transactions costs and risks of hefty penalties is that “the extensive
due diligence required and the fear of FCPA repercussions have a
chilling effect on many mergers and acquisitions in today’s business
131. Grimm, supra note 8, at 299-300.
132. Terwilliger, supra note 5, at 2.
133. Baker et al., supra note 81, at 6.
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world.”134 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Guidance Request
Letter also focused on the FCPA’s chill on mergers and acquisitions,
noting that a strong deterrent effect exists “even if a thorough
investigation is undertaken prior to a transaction.”135 Though the
Chamber’s letter represents over three million businesses, even the
Chamber itself was incapable of tallying the number of deals
avoided because of potential FCPA successor liability issues.136 But
a safe harbor provision counteracts any chilling effect from the
FCPA by facilitating leniency in high-risk transactions where
uncertainty would have been highest.
B. Furthering the Purpose of the FCPA
Likewise, a safe harbor provision is also beneficial policy for law
enforcement because it reinforces the FCPA’s purpose to reduce
corruption.137 The safe harbor allows more companies to engage in
the acquisition of foreign companies, which reduces global corrup-
tion by allowing more entities to become subject to FCPA via
acquisition.138 In a hypothetical transaction without a safe harbor
provision, an acquiring company that is already subject to the FCPA
might avoid acquiring a target that is not subject to the FCPA
because that target is in a high risk country or industry. In this
case, with the merger abandoned, the target company has no
incentives to discontinue its corrupt practices. In this event, the
FCPA actually works against its purpose of reducing bribery while
134. D. Michael Crites & Mark A. Carter, Why the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
Hurting Our Businesses and Needs to Be Reformed, NAT’L L. REV., May 15, 2011, at 1,
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/why-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-hurting-our-
businesses-and-needs-to-be-reformed.
135. Chamber Letter, supra note 2, at 6; see id. at 2 (“The result of these circumstances has
been a chilling effect on legitimate business activity ... and a costly misallocation of
compliance resources (as companies dedicate resources to policing and investigating even such
remote and attenuated situations).”).
136. See supra Part II.
137. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 90 (“The FCPA was designed to prevent corrupt
practices, protect investors, and provide a fair playing field for those honest companies trying
to win business based on quality and price rather than bribes.”).
138. Terwilliger, supra note 5, at 2 (“At its most elemental level, this procedure would serve
the fundamental objectives of the FCPA, which are to root out and eliminate corruption in the
global marketplace.”); Andy Spalding, Beyond Balance VII: Lost Opportunities of Successor
Liability, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/21/be
yond-balance-vii-lost-opportunities-of-successor-liability.html.
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also placing the compliant company at a disadvantage. But if the
transaction was regulated with a safe harbor provision, there would
be less risk for the acquirer, making the transaction more likely.
Once the target is merged into the acquirer, all business operations
of the target become subject to the FCPA, and all of its corrupt
practices must be discontinued quickly and permanently. The
ultimate result is that, by reducing risk, the safe harbor provision
facilitates more mergers and acquisitions, brings more businesses
under the governance of the FCPA, and reduces global corruption.
C. Alternatives and Counterarguments
Companies engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions may
consider alternative strategies to avoid risk of successor liability.
Where a safe harbor is unavailable, companies may change the deal
structure from a complete purchase or merger. In some situations,
companies could structure the deal as an asset purchase or a stock
purchase.139 In these structures, dealmakers could negotiate who
would retain the liability for penalties or isolate those liabilities in
a subsidiary.140
One reason why a safe harbor provision would still be preferable
to such deal structures is that the liability avoidance strategies in
both asset sales and stock purchases are merely ways to allocate
uncertain risk.141 A safe harbor provision is preferable because,
instead of allocating uncertain risk, it provides certainty that any
risk has been removed.142 This means that parties are able to
conduct more efficient business transactions because prices are not
distorted by uncertain risk that may or may not exist.
139. See supra Part II.
140. See OESTERLE, supra note 29, at 215-17; see also Henning, supra note 109 (“In
practical terms, this means deal lawyers concerned about potential exposure to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act will probably structure transactions to ensure the company being
acquired retains its legal incorporation, so that unit can absorb any charges.”).
141. See WALT LEMANSKI, PATTON BOGGS LLP, RISK ALLOCATION: DRIVING FORCE BEHIND
THE  M&A PROCESS (2008), http://www.pattonboggs.com/files/News/616c75c6-2167-49a4-8b5b-
1 0 1 e 6 9 9 e f 0 3 e /Pres ent a t i on /N ews A t t a chm ent /3 3 f 6 7 0 f 1 - 2 5 a 0 - 4 5 4 6 - 8 8 e 3 -
10dbee1a3fda/FinancierWwd_RiskAllociation_06.08.pdf.
142. The safe harbor may not remove all risk permanently, but it can remove all risk for
the period to which it applies.
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Another alternative to a safe harbor provision would be case-by-
case deferred prosecution agreements that grant similar post-
acquisition leniency, as the DOJ has done in several recent cases.143
These decisions have results similar to a safe harbor provision
because they allow for post-acquisition due diligence and reporting.
Unlike a safe harbor provision, however, the issued agreements do
not allow the parties the assurance that they will not be penalized.
Instead, a deferred prosecution allows a company to avoid a formal
indictment, but still pay penalties as if it had been found guilty.144
Some agreements, such as the one granted to Pfizer, allow for post-
acquisition reporting as part of its requirements, but only as part of
a complex penalty structure.145 A safe harbor provision, on the other
hand, is much simpler to navigate because it is not issued on a case-
by-case basis. Companies enter into a transaction with confidence
that they will not be prosecuted, which they would lack if requesting
individual opinions and deferred prosecution agreements from the
DOJ and the SEC. Furthermore, while deferred prosecution
agreements carry with them a backdrop of enforced penalties,146 the
basis for the safe harbor is a grace period from any penalties and
the facilitation of beneficial transactions.
One possible argument against a safe harbor provision is that
instead of reducing transaction costs, it only defers them until after
143. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 8 (“For example, the Data Systems and Bizjet deferred
prosecution agreements require that the companies conduct ‘appropriate risk-based’ anti-
corruption due diligence for potential mergers and acquisitions, implement anti-corruption
policies and procedures ‘as quickly as practicable,’ and conduct FCPA-specific audits of newly
acquired or merged businesses.”).
144. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Address at the Meeting of the
New York City Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/
crm-speech-1209131.html (“[A] DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative
effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the government, or [a non-
prosecution agreement] for that matter, it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing,
agree to cooperate with the government’s investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve ... its
compliance program, and agree to face prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the
agreement. All of these components of DPA are critical for accountability.”).
145. See Pfizer Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Attachment C.2-6 ¶ 9 (Aug. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/PfizerFCPA-AttachmentC.pdf (“When such
anticorruption due diligence is appropriate but not practicable prior to acquisition of a new
business for reasons beyond Pfizer's control, or due to any applicable law, rule, or regulation,
Pfizer has conducted and will conduct anti-corruption due diligence subsequent to the
acquisition and report to the Department any corrupt payments.”).
146. Breuer, supra note 144.
338 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:305
a merger is finalized and when the acquiring party loses its
flexibility to negotiate or abandon a deal. If the acquirer does not
have the benefit of a safe harbor provision, then greater pre-
acquisition due diligence is required. If that due diligence reveals
that the target company is likely to have liability for severe FCPA
violations, the acquirer can simply abandon the deal, which avoids
further due diligence and costly remediation measures that would
be required post-acquisition. On the other hand, if given a safe
harbor period, acquiring companies might delay certain due
diligence processes pre-acquisition, knowing they have a post-
acquisition grace period. But if serious problems are later identified,
the subsequent remediation and compliance measures could be far
more expensive than proper pre-acquisition due diligence and
avoidance of the target.147 This means that uncertainty of a risk
would still be priced into the deal, retaining its transaction costs,
although in a different form. Instead of risking the cost of law
enforcement penalties, the acquiring company must instead risk the
cost of post-acquisition remedies and compliance.
The response to this argument is that even if the safe harbor
delays some transaction costs, it ultimately reduces the total
transaction costs for the deal. In cross-border deals where proper
due diligence is difficult, the costs of diligence and remediation are
much lower post-closing than they would be pre-acquisition because
the deal avoids pre-merger antitrust and exchange of information
laws.148 This means that total transaction costs are reduced in the
aggregate because the pre-acquisition expenses are reduced much
more than any increase in post-acquisition expenses.
CONCLUSION
In its letter representing over three million businesses and
organizations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce highlighted the
uncertainty that businesses face when navigating FCPA successor
liability in cross-border mergers and acquisitions.149 Part of this
difficulty is inherent in many of these transactions where proper
147. E-mail from Kevin Grady, Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to author (Sept.
4, 2012) (on file with author). 
148. See supra Part II.A.1.
149. See Chamber Letter, supra note 2, at 28-34.
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pre-acquisition due diligence can be costly, time-consuming, or
impossible.150 As a result, in previous circumstances the DOJ and
the SEC have allowed acquiring companies to have some safe
harbor from continuing misconduct that occurs post-acquisition. In
their recently issued Guidance, the Agencies explained that an
acquiring company in this situation has the option to proactively
avail itself of the safe harbor provisions granted to Halliburton in
Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02. This new extension is a
strong step in the right direction towards reducing uncertainty and
facilitating transactions, but more should be done because of the
inherent limitations in its disclosure schedule and the remaining
uncertainty. In addition to the Guidance, the FCPA should be
amended to grant a clearly defined safe harbor to all transactions
that meet the articulated requirements and that allows for compa-
nies to bear the burden of complying with a quick, but reasonable
disclosure schedule that conforms to the nature of the transaction.
Such a safe harbor provision, whether extended by the Guidance
or clearly amended in the FCPA, would benefit both multinational
businesses and the agencies enforcing the FCPA because it would
reduce transaction costs, facilitate more mergers and acquisitions,
and bring more companies under the jurisdiction of the FCPA. As a
result, more companies would be able to engage in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions while decreasing global corruption.
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